Research
Research Agenda & Major Projects
My research examines international security and comparative political economy, with a focus on the domestic foundations of military power and international behavior.
My main lines of research are:
Industrial mobilization and industrial policy, examining how states translate economic resources into military power during war
National security institutions and bureaucratic design, analyzing how institutional structures shape executive control over security policy
Military deployments and escalation dynamics, including the role of “tripwires” in shaping deterrence
Methodologically, I combine multilingual archival research with original cross-national datasets, with a regional focus on Japan and East Asia.
Peer-Reviewed Publications
American Arms and Industry in a Changing International Order. Defence Studies. 2024. With Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Frank Finelli, Isak Kulalic, and Mark Wilson. (link)
Argues that the U.S. defense industrial base has been optimized for peacetime efficiency and low-attrition conflicts since the end of the Cold War, privileging cost savings over capacity, flexibility, and resilience. It shows why the rise of China as a peer competitor and the demands of potential protracted conflict require a more intentional and direct U.S. role in shaping defense industrial capability and capacity.
Paying the Defense Bill: Financing American and Chinese Geostrategic Competition Texas National Security Review. 2023. With Rosella Cappella Zielinski. (link)
Examines domestic political constraints on defense spending in the United States and China, showing how institutional and political incentives shape military budgets beyond simple threat-based or regime-type explanations. It highlights how internal political tradeoffs condition states’ ability to sustain military investment over time.
Featured on the War on the Rocks Net Assessment Podcast (link)
Working Papers
Leaders and Legislators in the Design of National Security Organizations
[under review]
Abstract: Leader authority to shape policy processes is constrained by the formal design of national security organizations, among the most important of which are national security councils (NSC). While most advanced democracies have an NSC, their design varies across states. Some, like the US and Japan, provide leaders with significant authority to shape the policy process. Others, like in Germany and Israel, limit leader authority. This variation confounds structural theories that predict convergence of organizational design and theories that assume leaders can freely shape institutions. I argue that leaders can reshape institutions only when they gain the support of legislators. Legislators typically prioritize oversight capacity and their own influence over foreign policy but will support leader initiatives when crisis management failures drive changes in their electoral incentives. Evidence from a novel dataset of NSCs in advanced democracies and three case studies supports this argument.
Industrial Mobilization for War: Conversion Distance, State-Business Relations, and Wartime Production
Abstract: Why do some states rapidly and efficiently mobilize industry to transform economic potential into material military power while others do not? This article develops a theory of mobilization capacity that explains variation in industrial mobilization with two mechanisms: conversion distance, the gap between peacetime economic output and wartime production needs, and embedded autonomy, the combination of insulated mobilization agencies and institutionalized information exchange with industry. When conversion distance is short, increasing military production is faster and less costly. When agencies exhibit embedded autonomy, states can develop sound mobilization policy and discipline firms. A most-similar comparison of Japan and Italy in World War II illustrates the argument. Despite comparable economic resources, regime type, and threat environments, Japan produced roughly four times as much military equipment as Italy between 1940 and 1943. These findings challenge materialist and institutional accounts of power generation, conceptualize industrial mobilization as essential to national power, and offer a framework for evaluating debates over industrial policy and great-power competition.
Do Tripwires Deter? How Small Forward Deployments Contribute to Extended Deterrence (with Samuel Leiter)
[under review]
Order Maker, Taker, and Breaker: Renewing the IR-APD Research Tradition (with Matthew J. Conklin)
[under review]
Abstract: How has the rise of China as an economic, technological, and military competitor influenced U.S. domestic politics? Will long-term competition with China lead to an expansion of the capacities and authorities of the American state? How might polarization, the rise of populism, or the distributional effects of industrial policy affect U.S. commitment to the international order? We argue that the IR-APD research program—scholarship at the intersection of International Relations and American political development—provides an analytical framework to investigate how and why the U.S. shapes and is shaped by the wider world. We identify three approaches for applying an IR-APD framework. An inside-out approach explains variation in U.S. foreign policy as a function of domestic variables familiar to scholars of American Politics. An outside-in approach centers the IR insight that a state’s position within the international system can be a “cause” of domestic politics and development. The interactive approach focuses on the mutual constitution of foreign and domestic politics, emphasizing the tendency for international challenges to create new domestic interests (and vice versa) that shape future political and economic contestation patterns. We illustrate the value of these approaches by examining U.S.-China competition. A revitalized IR-APD research program can offer insight into the U.S. as an international order maker, taker, and breaker.
Allied Abandonment in WWII (with Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Ryan Grauer, and Jonathan Martin)
Datasets
Military Production Dataset
Annual wartime output of major weapons systems by defense industrial powers in wartime.
National Security Council Dataset
Data on the formal design characteristics of NSCs in 48 major democracies from 1945 to 2023. Also includes data on attempted reforms, whether they succeeded or failed, and how reform was attempted.
Battlefield Coalitions Dataset
With Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Ryan Grauer, and Jonathan Martin
Image Source: Eberhard Grossgasteiger