Research
Peer-Reviewed Publications
“American Arms and Industry in a Changing International Order” (with Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Frank Finelli, Isak Kulalic, and Mark Wilson). Defence Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2023.2279624 (link)
“Paying the Defense Bill: Financing American and Chinese Geostrategic Competition” (with Rosella Cappella Zielinski). Texas National Security Review (2023) (link)
Featured on the War on the Rocks Net Assessment Podcast (link)
Working Papers
Order Maker, Taker, and Breaker: Renewing the IR-APD Research Tradition (with Matthew J. Conklin)
[under review]
Abstract: How has the rise of China as an economic, technological, and military competitor influenced U.S. domestic politics? Will long-term competition with China lead to an expansion of the capacities and authorities of the American state? How might polarization, the rise of populism, or the distributional effects of industrial policy affect U.S. commitment to the international order? We argue that the IR-APD research program—scholarship at the intersection of International Relations and American political development—provides an analytical framework to investigate how and why the U.S. shapes and is shaped by the wider world. We identify three approaches for applying an IR-APD framework. An inside-out approach explains variation in U.S. foreign policy as a function of domestic variables familiar to scholars of American Politics. An outside-in approach centers the IR insight that a state’s position within the international system can be a “cause” of domestic politics and development. The interactive approach focuses on the mutual constitution of foreign and domestic politics, emphasizing the tendency for international challenges to create new domestic interests (and vice versa) that shape future political and economic contestation patterns. We illustrate the value of these approaches by examining U.S.-China competition. A revitalized IR-APD research program can offer insight into the U.S. as an international order maker, taker, and breaker.
The Politics of Process: Leaders, Legislators, and Bureaucrats in National Security Council Design
[under review]
Abstract: National security councils (NSC)—permanent, centralized coordinating organizations for national security policy—influence the degree of control leaders exercise over the decision-making process. However, while most democracies have an NSC, the design of these bodies varies across states, with significant policy implications. As Japan has shown, a powerful NSC can facilitate strategic adjustment to new international challenges by providing leaders with exceptional control over the national security process. Other NSCs, like Germany’s, are peripheral to the policy process. Why do some states create powerful NSCs, and others create weak ones? Using a novel dataset that captures all NSCs in advanced democracies since 1945, I propose a theory to explain variation in organizational design. I argue leaders respond to international crises by attempting to create powerful NSCs because they believe doing so will mitigate coordination and principal-agent problems in national security policy. The outcome of this effort, however, is determined by contestation among domestic political actors, including legislators and bureaucrats wary of centralization. I find that leaders succeed in creating powerful NSCs only when international crises also generate domestic political crises that incentivize legislators to act. I test this theory through a most-similar research design: the creation and evolution of Germany and Japan’s weak NSCs in 1955, through a series of successful and failed reform attempts, to the creation of Japan’s powerful council in 2013 and the failed attempt by Germany to create strong council in 2023.
Do Tripwires Deter? How Small Forward Deployments Contribute to Extended Deterrence (with Samuel Leiter)
[under review]
Abstract: The credibility of extended deterrence underpins the U.S. alliance system. Forward-deployed tripwire forces are one tool used to enhance the credibility of U.S. commitments. Cold War conventional wisdom holds that these small, vulnerable deployments improve deterrence by increasing the credibility of the sending state’s commitment to fight to defend the host, but recent scholarship has challenged their effectiveness. These new critiques argue that tripwire forces’ lack of capability means they do not deter, and that the public will not punish leaders who back down in response to attacks on these forces. We contend that the emerging conventional wisdom relies on imprecise definitions of tripwire forces, misreads historical cases, and overlooks mechanisms by which tripwires contribute to deterrence. This paper defines tripwire forces using a novel typology of forward-deployed forces. It then explains how tripwires enhance deterrence through domestic audience costs, automatic military action, and international reputation. Using historical case studies of tripwires that draw on archival evidence, the paper demonstrates that tripwires enhance the credibility of extended deterrence commitments through previously ignored mechanisms
Allied Abandonment in WWII (with Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Ryan Grauer, and Jonathan Martin)
Data Sets
National Security Council Dataset
Includes data on the formal design characteristics of NSCs in 48 major democracies from 1945 to 2023. Also includes data on attempted reforms, whether they succeeded or failed, and how reform was attempted.
Battlefield Coalitions Dataset, with Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Ryan Grauer, and Jonathan Martin
Image Source: Eberhard Grossgasteiger